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Ohio Annotations to the Uniform Partnership Act
The Uniform Partnership Act became effective in Ohio Sep-
tember 14, 1949.' The purpose of this annotation is to correlate
the pertinent Ohio cases decided under the case and statute law
which existed before that date2 with the sections of the Ohio Gen-
eral Code which constitute the Act. Only cases in the official
reports have been noted. Citation of a case, without more, follow-
ing a section number or subdivision symbol of the Code means
that the law of that case is in substance that of the statutory pro-
vision referred to by the section number or subdivision symbol.
Addition merely of a parenthetical statement following a citation
indicates only that it was deemed necessary to call attention to a
particular factor in the case. When no reference is made to a Code
section or subdivision, this denotes that no cases pertinent to that
section or subdivision of the Code have been found.'
SEC. 8105-4 (2). Morgenthaler v. Cohen, 103 Ohio St. 328,
132 N.E. 730 (1921); Feigley v. Whitaker, 22 Ohio St. 606
(1872); Main Cloak & Suit Co. v. Rosenbaum, 42 Ohio App. 12,
181 N.E. 556 (1931); see Aspinwall v. Williams, 1 Ohio 84,
95 (1823).
(3). Queen City Petroleum Products Co. v. Norwood-Hyde
Park Bank & Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 397, 197 N.E. 357 (1934).
SEC. 8105-6 (1). The Ohio definition is substantially simi-
lar. Farmer's Insurance Co. v. Ross, 29 Ohio St. 429, 431 (1876);
Aspinwall v. Williams, 1 Ohio 84 (1823); Herrmann v. Rohn,
8 Ohio App. 303 (1917).
As a part of the general definition of partnerships, Ohio courts
have mentioned the following elements: (1) mutual agency-
Union Savings & Loan Co. v. Cook, 127 Ohio St. 26, 186 N.E.
728 (1933); Goubeaux v. Krickenberger, 126 Ohio St. 302, 185
N.E. 201 (1933); Southern Ohio Public Service Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission, 115 Ohio St. 405, 154 N.E. 365 (1926);
1 Omo GEN. CODE §§ 8105-1 to 8105-43, 123 Ohio Laws 144. The following
sections of the Ohio Code contain minor variations from the corresponding
sections of the Uniform Partnership Act as adopted by the Commissioners on
Uniform Laws: 8105-8 (3), 8105-25 (2) (e), 8105-37, 8105-25 (d).
2 Research ended with page 206 of volume 152 of the Ohio Supreme Court
Reports, and page 332 of volume 85 of the Ohio Appellate Reports.
3 For an excellent general discussion of the Ohio law as affected by the Act,
see Mathews and Folkerth, Ohio Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act,
9 Omo ST. L.J. 616 (1948).
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Harvey v. Childs & Potter, 28 Ohio St. 319 (1876); Beierla v.
Hockenedel, 25 Ohio App. 186, 157 N.E. 573 (1927); (2) shar-
ing profits and losses-see Harvey v. Childs & Potter, 28 Ohio
St. 319, 323 (1876); (3) fiduciary relation-Yeoman v. Lasley,
40 Ohio St. 190 (1883). See also McFadden v. Leeka, 48 Ohio
St. 513, 528, 28 N.E. 874, 878 (1891); Hulett v. Fairbanks, 40
Ohio St. 233, 244 (1883). The more recent cases have empha-
sized the mutual agency element.
Though the Act does not specifically mention oral partner-
ships, it has been recognized in Ohio that the partnership relation
may be created by oral agreement. Furth v. Farkasch, 26 Ohio
App. 258, 159 N.E. 142 (1927).
Prior to the enactment of OHIO GENERAL CODE § 8623-8,
which provides that an Ohio corporation is possessed of the same
capacity as natural persons, it had been held that a corporation
could not be a member of a partnership. Merchant's National
Bank v. Wehrmann, 69 Ohio St. 160, 68 N.E. 1004 (1903);
Guerinck v. Alcott, 66 Ohio St. 94, 63 N.E. 714 (1902). The
question has not been considered by the courts since enactment of
§ 8623-8. Reading § 8105-6 in conjunction with § 8105-2, where-
in "person"' is defined to include corporation, and with § 8623-8,
it appears that a corporation can join a partnership. For a dis-
cussion of an interesting aspect of this problem, see Crawford,
May an Ohio Corporation Enter an Argentine Partnership?, 13
U. of Cin. L. Rev. 559.
(2). Second Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Hall, 35 Ohio St.
158 (1878); Medill v. Collier, 16 Ohio St. 599 (1866); Wick-
hamv. Farmer's Bank, 21 Ohio App. 182, 152 N.E. 763 (1925).
SEc. 8105-7 (1). Valentine v. Hickle, 39 Ohio St. 19 (1883);
Second Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Hall, 35 Ohio St. 158 (1878)
(shareholders in defective corporation).
(2). Union Savings & Loan Co. v. Cook, 127 Ohio St. 26,
186 N.E. 728 (1933).
(3). Southern Ohio Public Service v. Public Utilities Com-
mission, 115 Ohio St. 405, 154 N.E. 365 (1926) (on authority
of Harvey v. Childs & Potter, 28 Ohio St. 319 (1876), deemed
agency relation also necessary); Coleman v. LaBounty Amuse-
ment Co., 21 Ohio App. 44, 153 N.E. 90 (1925) (gross receipts
divided equally); see Wood v. Vallette, 7 Ohio St. 172, 179 (1857).
(4) No cases have been found which hold that sharing in
the profits is or is not prima facie evidence of a partnership.
(a). Harvey v. Childs & Potter, 28 Ohio St. 319 (1876).
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(b). For the view that receiving as wages an interest in the
profits results in a partnership, while receiving as wages a sum
of money proportioned to the profits does not, see Wood v.
Vallette, 7 Ohio St. 172, 179 (1857). More recent cases (see
comment under § 8105-6 (1), this annotation) have stressed the
existence of the mutual agency element in determining the exist-
ence of a partnership, rather than the sharing of profits. There-
fore, it is unlikely that the distinction drawn in Wood v. Vallette
is valid today.
SEc. 8105-8 (1.) Goepper v. Kinsinger, 39 Ohio St. 429
(1883) (must be by way of capital contribution of a partner or
by way of purchase with partnership funds). The partnership
interest may be equitable. Wade v. DeHart, 26 Ohio App. 177,
159 N.E. 838 (1927).
(2). Norwalk Nat. Bank v. Sawyer, 38 Ohio St. 339, (1882).
(3). Prior to the adoption of this section, a partnership could
not acquire legal title to real property in its firm name. Rammels-
berg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22 (1875). However, various de-
vices were employed by the courts to effectuate the intent of the
partners that real property be considered that of the partnership,
or to protect the creditors of the partnership by enabling them to
reach property which, although it did not stand in the partnership
name, was actually partnership property: (1) partners consid-
ered as holding title in trust for partnership-Page v. Thomas,
43 Ohio St. 38, 1 N.E. 79 (1885); (2) third party considered
as holding property in trust for partnership-Wade v. DeHart, 26
Ohio App. 177, 159 N.E. 838 (1927); (3) real estate considered
converted into personalty-Ludlow v. Cooper's Devisees, 4 Ohio
St. 1 (1854); Greene v. Greene, 1 Ohio 535 (1824); see Ram-
melsberg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22, 52 (1875); Miller v. Proctor,
20 Ohio St. 442, 448 (1870).
SEc. 8105-9 (1). Ohio has held that a partnership is bound
by the unauthorized act of a partner if the person with whom he
dealt was without knowledge of the partner's restricted authority
and if the transaction was consistent with the business of the
partnership. Benninger v. Hess, 41 Ohio St. 64 (1884); see Har-
vey v. Childs & Potter, 28 Ohio St. 319, 323 (1876); Gano v.
Samuel, 14 Ohio 592, 601 (1846).
For cases developing generally partnership liability on prin-
ciples of agency, see Union Savings & Loan v. Cook, 127 Ohio
St. 26, 186 N.E. 728 (1933); Southern Ohio Public Service Co.
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v. Public Utilities Commission, 115 Ohio St. 405, 154 N.E. 365
(1926); Meier & Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 55 Ohio St. 446, 45
N.E. 907 (1896); Harper v. McKinnis, 53 Ohio St. 434, 42 N.E.
251 (1895); Valentine v. Hickle, 39 Ohio St. 19 (1883); Mc-
Kee v. Hamilton, 33 Ohio St. 7 (1877); Kleinhaus v. Generous,
25 Ohio St. 667 (1874); Gano v. Samuel, 14 Ohio 592 (1846).
(2). Morgenthaler v. Cohen, 103 Ohio St. 328, 132 N.E.
730 (1921) (transfer of all partnership assets); Thomas v. Penn-
rich, 28 Ohio St. 55 (1875); Heller v. Adelman, 50 Ohio App.
168, 197 N.E. 801 (1934) (accommodation note that was not
for parnership purposes); Queen City Petroleum Products Co. v
Norwood-Hyde Park Bank & Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 397, 197
N.E. 357 (1934); see Gano v. Samuel, 14 Ohio 592, 600 (1846);
see Yeoman v. Lasley, 40 Ohio St. 190 (1883); Rianhard v.
Hovey, 13 Ohio 300 (1844).
(3) (a). Holland v. Drake, 29 Ohio St. 441 (1876); quali-
fied in Clafflin Co. v. Evans, 55 Ohio St. 183, 45 N.E. 3 (1896)
(consent to assignment presumed given by non-resident partner
absent from state).
(d). See McAlpin Co. v. Finsterwald, 57 Ohio St. 524, 543,
49 N.E. 784, 787 (1898), wherein the court recognized the rule
expressed in this subsection but held it inapplicable in a collateral
proceeding by one creditor to set aside the judgment in favor of
a judgment creditor obtained on the confession of one partner
only, and indicated that the partner who did not confess judgment
must object, if he is to object at all, by way of defense in the action
in which the judgment creditor receives his judgment. The court
also indicated by way of dictum that consent of the other partners
to confession by one partner may be presumed as in Clafflin Co.
v. Evans, 55 Ohio St. 183, 45 N.E. 3 (1896). See McKee v.
Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 7 Ohio 175 (1836).
(4). See Benninger v. Hess, 41 Ohio St. 64 (1884).
SEC. 8105-10 (1). See comment under § 8105-8 (3).
(2). See comment under § 8105-8 (3).
(3). Norwalk Nat. Bank v. Sawyer, 38 Ohio St. 339 (1882);
Lewis v. Anderson, 20 Ohio St. 281 (1870) (holder of mortgage
for pre-existing debt not entitled to protection as bona fide pur-
chaser); Wade v. DeHart, 26 Ohio App. 177, 159 N.E. 838
(1927) (purchaser with knowledge considered trustee for benefit
of partnership).
SEC. 8105-11. Benninger v. Hess, 41 Ohio St. 64 (1884); see
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Crowell v. Western Reserve Bank, 3 Ohio St. 406, 414 (1854).
The same result was reached where the admissions were made by
a partner winding up the partnership after dissolution. Feigley v.
Whitaker, 22 Ohio St. 606 (1872); Myers v. Standart, 11 Ohio
St. 29 (1860).
SEC. 8105-12. Yoeman v. Lasley, 40 Ohio St. 190 (1883)
(court ordered rescission where partner assisted in fraudulently
inducing fellow partners to contract with third persons).
SEc. 8105-13. Tarlecka v. Morgan, 125 Ohio St. 319, 181
N.E. 450 (1932) (partnership liable though wrongful act not
done in advancing firm's interest or producing profit for its
benefit); Peekham Iron Co. v. Harper, 41 Ohio St. 100 (1884);
see Beierla v. Hockenedel, 25 Ohio App. 186, 191, 157 N.E. 573,
574 (1927).
No cases have been found which considered the question of
firm liability for penalties.
SEc. 8105-14 (a). Benninger v. Hess, 41 Ohio St. 64 (1884);
Kleinhaus v. Generous, 25 Ohio St. 667 (1874).
(b). In re Liquidation of Exchange Bank of Bloomdale, 44
Ohio App. 385, 185 N.E. 848 (1933) (unincorporated bank).
SEc. 8105-15 (a). Goebel v. Hummel, 21 Ohio App. 486,
153 N.E. 223 (1926); see Tarlecka v. Morgan, 125 Ohio St.
319, 321, 181 N.E. 450, 451 (1932); Davis v. Gelhaus, 44 Ohio
St. 69, 78, 4 N.E. 593, 598 (1886).
(b). Bazell v. Belcher, 31 Ohio St. 572 (1877); Simon v.
Rudner, 43 Ohio App. 38, 182 N.E. 650 (1932); see First Nat.
Bank v. Houtzer, 96 Ohio St. 404, 117 N.E. 383 (1917) (by con-
tract, liability both joint and several); Moore v. Gano, 12 Ohio
301 (1843); see Choteau v. Raitt, 20 Ohio 132, 144 (1851).
SEc. 8105-16 (1) (a). Goepper v. Kinsinger, 39 Ohio St.
429 (1883); Speer v. Bishop, 24 Ohio St. 598 (1874); Reber
& Kutz v. Columbus Mach. Mfg. Co., 12 Ohio St. 175 (1861);
Main Cloak & Suit Co. v. Rosenbaum, 42 Ohio App. 12, 181 N.E.
556 (1931); accord, Wood v. Vallette, 7 Ohio St. 172 (1857);
see Aspinwall v. Williams, 1 Ohio 84, 95 (1823); Daly v. Savage,
12 Ohio App. 471, 472 (1920). Ohio has held that a person
seeking to hold another liable as a partner cannot rely on state-
ments made to the former by persons who were complete strangers
to the alleged partner, where there is no evidence that the alleged
partner had authorized the making of the statements. Cook v.
Slate Co., 36 Ohio St. 135 (1880); see Inglebright v. Hammond,
19 Ohio 337, 343 (1850).
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SEC. 8105-18. The partners may, by agreement, determine
their rights and duties as between themselves. Doan v. Rogan, 79
Ohio St. 372, 87 N.E. 263 (1909); Buchwalter v. ClenDening,
2 Ohio App. 139 (1913); see Steigert v. Steigert, 57 Ohio App.
255, 260, 13 N.E. 2d 583, 586 (1936).
(a). See State ex rel. Squire v. Steck, 132 Ohio St. 198, 204,
5 N.E. 2d 919, 922 (1937); Wischmeyer v. Siebeneck, 46 Ohio
App. 486, 492, 189 N.E. 509, 511 (1933).
(b). Gwin v. Sedley, 5 Ohio St. 97, 101 (1855) (creditor
may not set aside payment made to partner); see McFadden v.
Leeka, 48 Ohio St. 513, 530, 28 N.E. 874, 879 (1891). Ohio
has indicated that the partner must first seek an accounting before
he may maintain an action for reimbursement. See Kunneke v.
Mapel, 60 Ohio St. 1, 6, 53 N.E. 259, 261 (1899).
(f). Ohio cases prior to the Act have indicated in dicta that
the surviving partner is not entitled to a reasonable compensation
for his services in winding up partnership affairs. See Dayton v.
Bartlett, 38 Ohio St. 357, 361 (1882); Cameron v. Francisco, 26
Ohio St. 190, 194 (1875). In the latter case, in which the survivor
was under no obligation to continue the business, but did so at
his own peril, it was held that if the representatives of the deceased
partner elected to share in the profits for the period subsequent
to the dissolution a reasonable allowance might be deducted as
compensation to the survivor for his services. But see Stidger v.
Reynolds, 10 Ohio 352, 354 (1841).
(g). Channelv. Fassitt, 16 Ohio 166 (1847).
(h). See McFadden v. Leeka, 48 Ohio St. 513, 529, 28
N.E. 874, 878 (1891).
SEC. 8105-20. See Yeoman v. Lasley, 40 Ohio St. 190, 200
(1883).
SEC. 8105-21 (1). Reis v. Hellman, 25 Ohio St. 180 (1874);
Eagle v. Bucher, 6 Ohio St. 296 (1856); Stidger v. Reynolds, 10
Ohio 352 (1841); see Gray v. Kerr, 46 Ohio St. 652, 658, 23
N.E. 136, 138 (1889).
(2). Dayton v. Bartlett, 38 Ohio St. 357 (1882).
SEC. 8105-22 (a). Eagle v. Bucher, 6 Ohio St. 296 (1856).
(c). See Oglesby v. Thompson, 59 Ohio St. 60, 51 N.E.
878 (1898).
(d). It has been held that a partner is not entitled to an ac-
counting when the transaction for which the accounting is sought
is itself illegal. Davis v. Gelhaus, 44 Ohio St. 69, 4 N.E. 593
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(1886); Thatcher v. Meck, 49 Ohio App. 92, 195 N.E. 254
(1934).
SEc. 8105-25 (1). See 7 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 144
for discussion of the term "tenant in partnership."
(2) (a). See Nixon v. Nash, 12 Ohio St. 647, 649 (1861);
see Alfele v. Wright, 17 Ohio St. 238 (1867) (slander action de-
cided on issue of partner's right to possession of partnership prop-
erty).
(c). The Ohio cases do not speak of a "right in specific part-
nership property." A partner's interest in the firm's tangible
property has been held liable to seizure upon execution by a cred-
itor of an individual partner. Nixon v. Nash, 12 Ohio St. 647
(1861) (after levy and sale only beneficial interest of debtor-part-
ner is acquired, which is partner's residuary share after partnership
accounts are settled); Sullins v. Burry, 39 Ohio App. 556, 177
N.E. 378 (1930). But cf. Myers v. Smith, 29 Ohio St. 120
(1876) (intangible property); Sutcliffe v. Dohrman, 18 Ohio 181
(1849); Place v. Sweetzer, 16 Ohio 142 (1847).
Ohio has held that partners of an insolvent firm cannot claim
any right under exemption laws as far as partnership property is
concerned, after it has been seized in execution by partnership
creditors, even though all the partners join in demanding the
exemption, Gaylord v. Imhoff, 26 Ohio St. 317 (1875), and even
though the partners are husband and wife, Aultman v. Wilson,
55 Ohio St. 138, 44 N.E. 1092 (1896) (vesting of partnership
property in an assignee for benefit of creditors is legal equivalent
of its seizure in execution).
(d). Ohio cases have reached inconsistent results as to the
rights in real property which, on the death of a partner, vest in
the surviving partner or legal representative.
One case held that on the death of a partner legal title to
partnership property vested in the surviving partner for the pur-
pose of winding up the partnership affairs. Kreis v. Gorton, 23
Ohio St. 468 (1872) (not stated whether personalty or realty);
see McGrath v. Cowen, 57 Ohio St. 385, 401, 49 N.E. 338, 340
(1898); Lockwood v. Mitchell, 7 Ohio St. 388, 410 (1857).
However, where the executor of the estate of the last surviving
partner completes the winding up of the partnership, he has been
held to be entitled to compensation for his services in so doing,
for the reason that, on the death of a partner, partnership property
is held in tenancy in common, and does not vest solely in the
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surviving partner, although he does have the sole right of posses-
sion to wind up the business. Dayton v. Bartlett, 38 Ohio St. 357
(1882). Where the widow of a deceased partner was both his
executrix and his devisee, and refused the valuation under OHIO
GENERAL CODE § 8089, she was held to be entitled to partition of
partnership property where rights of creditors were not involved,
since the devisee and surviving partner hold as tenants in common.
Weitz v. Weitz, 15 Ohio App. 134 (1921); cf. Greene v. Graham,
5 Ohio 264 (1831).
(e). Ludlow v. Coopers Devisees, 4 Ohio St. 1 (1854)
(realty considered converted into personalty by specific partner-
ship agreement, and as such, in equity, held to belong to adminis-
trators of deceased partner and not to heirs). But cf. Rammes-
berg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22 (1875); Weitz v. Weitz, 15 Ohio
App. 134 (1921). But see Sumner v. Hampson, 8 Ohio 328, 365
(1838); Greene v. Greene, 1 Ohio 535, 546 (1824).
SEc. 8105-26. See Rodgers v. Meranda, 7 Ohio St. 179, 182
(1857).
SEC. 8105-27 (1). Ohio by dictum prior to the Act has indi-
cated that assignment by a partner of his interest does cause a dis-
solution. See Miller v. Estill, 5 Ohio St. 508, 519 (1856).
SEC. 8105-28 (1). Prior to the enactment of this section, there
was no provision in Ohio for subjecting a partner's interest to a
charging order. See discussion under § 8105-25 (2) (c) for the
procedure previously employed by creditors of individual partners
to reach partnership property.
See comment under § 8105-41 (2), and § 8105-25 (2) (c)
as to a partner's right under the exemption laws.
SEC. 8105-30. See Dayton v. Bartlett, 38 Ohio St. 357, 361
(1882); Myers v. Standart, 11 Ohio St. 29, 40 (1860); see Bank
v. Green, 40 Ohio St. 431 (1884); Gardner v. Conn, 34 Ohio
St. 187 (1877).
SEC. 8105-31 (1) (a). Gray v. Kerr, 46 Ohio St. 652, 23
N.E. 136 (1889); see Horsey v. Heath, 5 Ohio 353, 357 (1832).
(b). Eagle v. Bucher, 6 Ohio St. 295 (1856) (must be com-
municated to the other partner); see Snyder Mfg. Co. v. Snyder,
54 Ohio St. 86, 95, 43 N.E. 325, 328 (1896).
(c). Scott v. Clark, 1 Ohio St. 382 (1853); see Bettinger v.
Goebel, 4 Ohio App. 362, 365 (1915).
(4) McGrath v. Cowen, 57 Ohio St. 385, 49 N.E. 338
(1898); Pater v. Schumaker, 21 Ohio App. 528, 153 N.E. 230
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(1926); see Nahas v. George, 85 Ohio App. 328 (1949); In re
Gurnea, 111 Ohio St. 715, 719, 146 N.E. 308, 309 (1924).
In addition, Ohio has held that a complete assignment of assets
to firm creditors causes dissolution. Clafflin Co. v. Evans, 55
Ohio St. 183, 45 N.E. 3 (1896).
SEC. 8105-32 (1) (d). Durbin v. Barber, 14 Ohio 311
(1846).
SEC. 8105-33 (1) (a). Bank v. Green, 40 Ohio St. 431
(1884); Feigley v. Whitaker, 22 Ohio St. 606 (1872).
(b). See cases cited under § 8105-33 (1) (a).
SEC. 8105-34. No specific reference to this problem is made
in the Ohio cases. The following cases deal generally with the
right of partners to contribution from co-partners after dissolution:
Kunneke v. Mapel, 60 Ohio St. 1, 5, 53 N.E. 259, 261 (1899)
(dictum indicated accounting required before court will order
contribution); McFadden v. Leeka, 48 Ohio St. 513, 532, 28
N.E. 874, 880 (1891) (liability must result from acts within the
partner's authority); Gardner v. Conn, 34 Ohio St. 187, 193
(1887) (partner properly paying partnership debt in winding up
entitled to contribution).
SEC. 8105-35 (1) (a). Feigley v. Whitaker, 22 Ohio St. 606
(1872); see Gardner v. Conn, 34 Ohio St. 187, 192 (1877); see
Kerper v. Wood, 48 Ohio St. 613, 29 N.E. 501. (1891).
(b) (I). Myers v. Standart, 11 Ohio St. 29 (1860). But cf.
Middletown Lumber v. Martin, 10 Ohio App. 188 (1918) (re-
newal note given after dissolution and covering both pre-dissolu-
tion and post-dissolution debts held divisible).
(II). See Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21, 29 (1854).
(4). Speer v. Bishop, 24 Ohio St. 598 (1874)) (retiring part-
ner, though he had listed notice of dissolution in newspaper, held
liable to subsequent firm creditor where he permitted his name
to be used as part of the firm's name after withdrawing from the
partnership).
SEC. 8105-36 (1). Rawson v. Taylor, 30 Ohio St. 389 (1876);
Miller v. Estill, 5 Ohio St. 508 (1856); see Ross v. Couden, 22
Ohio App. 330, 335, 154 N.E. 527, 528 (1926).
(2). Reed v. Ramey, 82 Ohio App. 171, 80 N.E.2d 250
(1947); Schooley v. Wilker, 33 Ohio App. 462, 169 N.E. 829
(1929); see Rawson v. Taylor, 30 Ohio St. 389, 400 (1876).
(3). The Ohio cases have dealt with the -question whether
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obligations accepted by a creditor from a partner continuing the
business, for partnership debts owing to the creditor prior to dis-
solution, were accepted in discharge of the retiring partner's lia-
bility. Chase v. Brundage, 58 Ohio St. 517, 51 N.E. 31 (1898)
(creditor's acceptance of new certificates of deposit relieved retir-
ing partner of liability); Bank v. Green, 40 Ohio St. 431 (1884)
(agreement to release may be implied from conduct of parties);
Leach v. Church, 15 Ohio St. 169 (1864) (agreement to release
must be clearly and affirmatively shown).
(4). Horsey v. Heath, 5 Ohio 353 (1832).
SEC. 8105-37 (1). Dayton'v. Bartlett, 38 Ohio St. 357 (1882)
(legal representative); see Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21, 29
(1854). But cf. Anderson v. Nat. Fire Insurance Co., 22 Ohio
App. 209, 154 N.E. 51 (1926) (where partner does not continue
the business after dissolution, the receiver of the partnership is the
only proper party to bring an action on behalf of the firm).
See Nahas v. George, 85 Ohio App. 328 (1949) (procedure
prescribed by §§ 8085 to 8097, whereby surviving partner winds
up the partnership business, is mandatory).
SEC. 8105-38 (1). See Miller v. Estill, 5 Ohio St. 508, 516
(1856).
(2) (a) (II). See Vance v. Blair, 18 Ohio 532, 533 (1849).
Ohio has held that where the partnership has been wrongfully
dissolved by breach of the partnership contract, the innocent part-
ner, having obtained winding up, cannot thereafter maintain an
action for breach of the partnership agreement, but must include
damages for the breach in his claim for settlement in the winding
up action. Cockley v. Brucker, 54 Ohio St. 214, 44 N.E. 590
(1896).
SEC. 8105-40 (b) (I). (No cases have been found in which
partnership creditors and partners competed for the assets of the
partnership.) See Page v. Thomas, 43 Ohio St. 38, 42, 1 N.E.
79, 82 (1885); Norwalk Nat. Bank v. Sawyer, 38 Ohio St. 339,
343 (1882) (one who became a firm creditor after partner mort-
gaged his interest in partnership realty to secure a personal debt
entitled to priority over mortgagee); Nixon v. Nash, 12 Ohio St.
647, 649 (1861); Rodgers v. Meranda, 7 Ohio St. 179, 181
(1857); Miller v. Estill, 5 Ohio St. 508, 519 (1856) (partners
cannot assign firm property for benefit of individual creditors to
exclusion of firm creditors); see Second Nat. Bank v. Hyder, 29
Ohio App. 357, 163 N.E. 587 (1928) (claim of partner for
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capital and advances given priority over claim of individual cred-
itor of co-partner).
(d). Rianhard v. Hovey, 13 Ohio 300 (1844). See case
under (f).
(f). Gardner v. Conn, 34 Ohio St. 187 (1877) (effect of
insolvency of some but not all partners not in issue).
(h). Meier & Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 55 Ohio St. 446, 45
N.E. 907 (1896) (where firm creditor recovered judgment
against maker-partners on a note, this did not extinguish partner-
ship liability nor exclude the creditor from participating in distri-
bution of partnership property along with other firm creditors);
Norwalk Nat. Bank v. Sawyer, 38 Ohio St. 339 (1882) (one who
became firm creditor after individual partner mortgaged his inter-
est in partnership realty, given priority over mortgagee); Sigler
v. Knox County Bank, 8 Ohio St. 511 (1858) (firm creditors
may not set aside payment by the partnership, from partnership
assets, of an individual debt of one of .the partners, when the
payment had been agreed to in advance by all the partners in
good faith); Miller v. Estill, 5 Ohio St. 508 (1856); Second Nat.
Bank v. Hyder, 29 Ohio App. 357, 163 N.E. 587 (1928) (co-
partner given priority over individual creditor of partner); see
Brownv. Brown, 107 Ohio St. 228, 232, 140 N.E. 754, 755 (1923) ;
Miller v. Proctor & Anderson, 20 Ohio St. 442, 446 (1870);
Rodgers v. Meranda, 7 Ohio St. 179, 194 (1857) (creditor of
individual partner shares equally with partnership creditors in
that part of partnership assets which had been advanced to part-
nership by that partner to defeat his individual creditors). But cf.
State ex rel. Squire v. Steck, 132 Ohio St. 198, 5 N.E.2d 919
(1937) (by statute, depositors of unincorporated bank share
equally with personal creditors); Brock v. Bateman, 25 Ohio St.
609 (1874) (firm creditors compete equally with individual cred-
itors in the personal estate of the partners where there are no
partnership assets for distribution to firm creditors); Grosvenor
& Co. v. Austin, 6 Ohio 104 (1833) (same).
SEc. 8105-41 (2). Ohio has held that the person continuing
the business may assert his statutory exemptions against a creditor
of the dissolved partnership. Mortley v. Flanagan, 38 Ohio St. 401
(1882). However, this rule was not applied where the partners
did not act in good faith. Casci v. Evans, 21 Ohio App. 288, 152
N.E. 764 (1921); see Pendleton v. Foley, 21 Ohio App. 118,
123, 152 N.E. 778, 779 (1925).
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SEC. 8105-42. See Cameron v. Francisco, 26 Ohio St. 190,
194 (1875) (representatives of deceased partner may elect to
share in the profits).
SEC. 8105-43. Gray v. Kerr, 46 Ohio St. 652, 23 N.E. 136
(1889).
FRED D. KIDDER
RICHARD C. RENKERT*
* This annotation is based in part upon research by these former students of
the School of Law: Jordan C. Band, Iona Caldwell, Eileen Foley, Carter Irvin,
Harry Kottler and Bettyanne Meyer.
